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henever we claim that our idea is better than another idea, it is Walways important to have a good understanding of  the 'inferior' 
idea and to be able to present our own one in a clear and coherent manner. 
The failure to do both will lead not only to a bad argument, but, more fatally, 
also to an unfair judgment of  the idea we oppose.
Unfortunately, in his essay the author is unsuccessful on both accounts. 
His lack of  understanding about the idea he opposes, i.e., empiricism, can be 
seen from what he regards as missing from positivism/empiricism, but 
captured by his 'cultural epistemology': “As a system of  human knowledge, 
science can be constructed by various cultural backgrounds […]. Traditions 
can be valuable sources of  knowledge […]. Society and culture can be seen as 
sources for epistemology, i.e. science is contextualized.”
He is not aware that empiricism does not necessarily have any problem 
with those assertions, because it only demands science to be autonomous in 
regard of  the context of  justification (the validation of  hypotheses). This 
simply means that scientific hypotheses' validity should be determined by 
facts alone. No social or religious institutions are allowed to decide which 
hypothesis is right or wrong. In the matter of  the context of  discovery (the 
process of  acquiring hypotheses), empiricism is welcoming any kind of  
source, including social ones.
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Another crucial feature of  empiricism the author misses is that the 
empiricistic idea about the autonomous nature of  science is a normative idea. 
It is about what science ought to be. People around the world may not see 
science that way. The author may be correct that “science is defined in 
different ways in different cultures.” But this fact has no relevance at all to 
rebut the empiricistic idea, since it alone does not show us why science 
should not be as empiricism wants it to be.
The last misunderstanding about empiricism worth mentioning, and the 
gravest one, is his view that only by leaving empiricism we can respect the 
importance of  the humanistic values supplied by our historical experiences. 
It is as if  positivism is committed to the claim that mankind only needs 
science to live successfully in this world. It is as if  positivism necessitates that 
we must infer the value or norm to live with solely from the facts revealed by 
science. This is false. We should remember that it is David Hume, one of  the 
pioneers of  empiricism, who first reminds us about the fallacy of  inferring 
norms directly from facts (commonly called the 'naturalistic fallacy').
Empiricism only concerns itself  with the best way to develop our 
knowledge about facts of  the world. It does not have anything to say about 
what kind of  goals we should serve with that knowledge, since it is not an 
ethical system. Thus it does not have anything against the effort to use 
science for “expansions of  humanity.”
After clarifying the notion of  empiricism, we can see that the difference 
between the author's position and empiricism is not as great as claimed. The 
only way he can keep a categorical distance from empiricism is by rejecting 
the empiricistic requirement of  science's autonomy in regard to the context 
of  justification. I take this as what he means when he asserts that “the pursuit 
of  all forms of  knowledge should be put within the metaphysical framework 
that embraces eternal values.”
The claim should be made more explicit, though, which is that cultural 
and religious institutions are allowed to determine the validity of  scientific 
hypotheses. Not only that, the precise meaning of  the claim must be made 
clearer. It should be clear whether the claim means that science's validity can 
never be free from cultural and religious influences (a factual claim) or that 
science's validity ought to be influenced by the social institutions (a 
normative claim). The author seems to want to embrace both of  them, as can 
be seen from the way he cites Harding and Manheim, who hold the first 
claim, and the way he refers to Sardar, who holds the second one. But this is 
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an unwise choice, for it will lead to a contradiction. Holding the first claim 
implies the futility of  the second one, while maintaining the second claim 
implies the falsity of  the first one.
However, based on my reading, the author is more willing to take the 
normative claim as his basis to reject empiricism's conception of  science. He 
is more inclined to say that science should not be as empiricism wants it to be. 
Let us just suppose for now that my guess is right, so that we can try to assess 
the reason he probably uses to back his position. We have seen earlier that an 
ethical world can be kept together with an empiricistic vision of  science, so it 
is intriguing to know what kind of  reason the author may still use to present 
his case against empiricism. Here, I believe he will say that the essential 
problem with empiricism is that it will make science permanently unable to 
fulfil the 'spiritual needs' of  mankind.
The author shows an enormous respect toward spiritual needs. His deep 
admiration may be responsible for his unawareness of  the lurking principal 
contradiction between cultural epistemology and the spiritualistic theory of  
knowledge. Cultural epistemology, as he admits, puts humans as the prime 
source of  knowledge, but spiritualistic epistemology, as he admits, puts the 
transcendent entity as the prime source.
Although he himself  does not explain rigorously enough about what he 
means by spiritual needs, I think it is safe to assume that what he means by 
that phrase is the need to believe in the existence of  an unobservable entity 
that behaves in fundamentally unpredictable ways, but can somehow affect 
the course of  events in our observable world. In short, it is the need to 
believe in the existence of  a spirit. It is true that empiricistic science is 
basically inimical to this kind of  belief. Science, in the end, will rationally 
eliminate the place of  spirit in our ontology. But what is wrong with it? 
Despite his great appreciation toward a spirit, he does not explain well 
enough why spirituality is indeed important for us. He repeatedly claims that 
spirituality is fundamental to our humanity, authenticity and dignity, but he 
does not explain why it must be the case. He probably believes that 
spirituality is the only basis of  our good values, as hinted by the following 
words: “the emphasis on the empirical implies a tendency to materialize 
everything so 'that science operates in an I-It mode, whereas religion 
operates in the I-Thou mode'.” But the belief  rests on a fallacious reasoning 
(the 'naturalistic fallacy' mentioned above).
The fact that we humans have no spirit or soul does not entail that we 
should see each other as objects to be exploited. Multiple moral narratives, 
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some may be good and some may be dangerous, can be made compatible 
with materialism. The same thing also happens to spiritualism, as 
demonstrated by our history where many moral narratives that advocate 
slavery and racism indeed take spiritualism as the basis of  their imperatives. 
Materialists can even argue that their position is better in limiting the amount 
of  possible harmful narratives. 
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